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RECENT CASES
EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING PROJECT
Stuyvesant Town is a housing project in process of construction by
Stuyvesant Town Corporation in an area comprising eighteen city blocks on
the east side of Manhattan in New York City. The project is to consist of 35
buildings containing 8,755 apartments which will house about 24,000 persons.
There are to be streets, parks, playgrounds, and shopping facilities, but no
schools. Moderate rentals will be charged. The cost of the project has been
estimated at $9o,ooqooo, all of which is being supplied to Stuyvesant Town
Corporation by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company from funds held for
the benefit of its policy holders.
The project is being erected under a contract entered into in June 1943 be-
tween the City and Stuyvesant and Metropolitan. Such contracts are au-
thorized by the Redevelopment Companies Law,' which was enacted to imple-
ment the "Housing Article" of the New York Constitution.2 The Redevelop-
ment Companies Law recites the public interest in low-cost housing and pro-
vides for the exercise of the eminent domain, police, and tax powers of the state
to attract private capital and make possible such projects. All of these powers
were exercised in the case of Stuyvesant Town: the City condemned the prop-
erty for the company; the residents of the area were forced to move elsewhere in
a period of acute housing shortage; the City turned over all the streets in the
area to Stuyvesant Town Corporation and placed it in complete control of
them; and a twenty-five-year tax exemption was granted on the improvements.
Soon after Stuyvesant Town was conceived it was announced that there
would be no interracial occupancy.3 The public reaction was so unfavorable that
in 1944 the New York City Council passed an lordinance4 prohibiting dis-
crimination because of race, creed, or color in the selection of business or resi-
dential tenants for any future projects granted tax exemption under the
Redevelopment Companies Law.
In June 1947 three Negro war veterans sued to enjoin Stuyvesant Town
Corporation and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company from refusing to
I New York Redevelopment Companies Law (McKinney, 1943) c. 234, § 3401-26. The
constitutionality of the Redevelopment Companies Law was upheld in Murray v. LaGuardia,
291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884 (1944), cert. den. 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
2Art. XVIii is known as the "Housing Article." Sec. x provides: "Subject to the provisions
of this article, the legislature may provide in such manner, by such means and upon such terms
and conditions as it may prescribe for low rent housing for persons of low income as defined
by law, or for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and
insanitary areas, or for both such purposes, and for recreational and other facilities incidental
or appurtenant thereto."
'Abrams, The Future of Housing 322 (i946).
4Administrative Code of the City of New York § J. 4r-1.2 (July, 1944). See also Local
Law 45, x947, which prohibits insurance companies from discriminating in tax-exempt proj-
ects.
.745
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
rent to them or other similarly situated solely because of their race or color.s
The plaintiffs sought relief chiefly on the theory that state aid and control were
so important in the project 6 that refusal to rent to them solely on the grounds of
race amounted to state action in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants admitted that it was their policy not
to rent to Negroes but contended that despite its public elements the project
was private and hence not subject to constitutional limitations. They pointed
out in support of this position that their contract with the City permitted them
to terminate the public controls at any time after five years by payment of past
tax exemptions with interest.7 The defendants maintained, moreover, that the
state legislature had shown an intention that redevelopment companies be free
to discriminate in the selection of tenants by its frequent refusal to pass bills
forbidding such discrimination. 8 They also argued that if they were prohibited
SIn Pratt v. LaGuardia, 294 N.Y. 842, 62 N.E. 2d 394 (i945), a similar suit was dismissed
as premature, since the project was not yet under way and the defendants answered that they
had not yet formed an admissions policy.
6New York Redevelopment Companies Law (McKinney, 1943) c. 234, § 3414 provides
that projects to be carried out under the authority of this law shall be designed and used
primarily for housing purposes; § 3423(i) provides that a project cannot be sold except as
permitted by law; § 34o8 limits profits to 6% for interest and amortization; §§ 34o5, 3415
set up a supervisory agency which must consent to the method of incorporation, the method
of financing, and to the use of a project, and a planning commission is empowered to make
final acceptance or rejection of a project; § 3415 also provides that the city's approval must
be obtained to any modification of a project; § 3415(2)c provides for rent control and requires
the consent of the city to increases; § 3424(I) provides that upon dissolution any cash sur-
plus belongs to the city; §§ 34o8-i3 impose far-reaching controls over the financing of re-
development corporations; § 3417 authorizes the state, municipalities, and all public officials
to sell, lease, or transfer property to a redevelopment company and hold its stock, income de-
bentures or other securities, secured or unsecured.
7The Contract of June i,"i943 entered into between the City of New York, Stuyvesant
Town Corporation, and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company provides, § 6oi, that at
any time after five years from the completion of the project Stuyvesant may pay the city the
total of all accrued taxes for which exemption has been granted, together with interest at 5%
per annum from the time such taxes would have become payable without penalty or interest
in the absence of such exemption, and thereupon all tax exemption as well as rent control
terminates. The parties thus intended that Stuyvesant should be able to slough off public
controls after 5 years; but for the first 5 years, at least, the city is to maintain controls. The
validity of the contract was upheld in Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 88A
(I944), cert. den. 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
8 See discussion of the legislative history in Kemp v. Rubin, 187 N.Y. Misc. 707, 69 N.Y.S.
2d 707 (1946). However, the New York Public Housing Law (McKinney, 1945), c. 808, § 223
prohibits discrimination because of race, color, creed, or religion in low-rent housing projects
erected pursuant to the provisions of that law. Art. XVIII, Sec. i of the state constitution
provides that a city or public corporation may engage "in building and operating low rent
housing for persons of low income as defined by law," but Art. XVHI, Sec. io prohibits
municipal corporations from "engaging in any private business or enterprise other than the
building and operation of low rent dwelling houses for persons of low income as defined by law."
Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals in Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884
(I944), cert. den. 321 U.S. 771 (1944), took the position that Stuyvesant Town involves only
the clearance and rehabilitation of a substandard and unsanitary area-not low-rent housing
for persons of low income, it would appear that Stuyvesant Town is not a public corporation;
therefore § 223 of the Public Housing Law does not apply.
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from discriminating the consequent decline in the value of the project's prop-
erty would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The New York trial court found Stuyvesant Town to be a private enterprise and
denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction. The Court said: "The funda-
mental fallacy in plaintiffs' argument is that it confuses 'public use' and 'public
purpose' with 'public project,' and assumes that, because the work of redevelop-
ment and rehabilitation is a public purpose, the project involved is necessarily
a public project... [The project itself is not now and never was a public proj-
ect." Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation.9
A companion case, Polier v. O'Dwyer,"° was dismissed summarily on the basis
of the opinion in the Dorsey case. This was a taxpayer's suit to restrain, upon
grounds similar to, those relied upon by the plaintiffs in the Dorsey case, further
performance of the contract by the City as long as Metropolitan and Stuyvesant
continued their discriminatory policy. The two cases have been consolidated for
appeal.
These cases represent another development in the increasing legal attack on
racial discrimination in housing. They present the same social problems as the
widely publicized restrictive covenant cases now before the Supreme Court"
but raise different constitutional issues. In the covenant litigation the Supreme
Court must decide whether judicial enforcement of express private agreements
to discriminate is state action. In the instant cases the question is at what point
state aid becomes so important to the construction of "private" housing devel-
opments that discrimination by the private owners becomes discrimination by
the state. The Dorsey case presents the additional issue of whether, even apart
from state aid, the proprietors of a large housing project exercise power which is
so analogous to state power that they may not discriminate. A Supreme Court
decision either way in the covenant cases, then, although useful as an index of
current judicial thinking, would not control the instant cases. And it is probable
that it is the instant cases which contain the more explosive constitutional
analogies.
The Dorsey decision was based in part upon the conclusion that omission of
9 74 N.Y.S. 2d 220, 226 (1947). The court was thus able to conclude that "... defendants
may exercise the usual powers and functions of an owner of a privately owned and controlled
apartment house, and.. . may, in managing the property, select its tenants upon any basis
which, in its judgment, is most likely to insure the success of the project and the safety of its
investment." Ibid., at 225.
10 New York Supreme Court No. 44213-47.
11 The Supreme Court has recently heard oral argument in four restrictive covenant cases,
noted in 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 193 (1947). The Review has followed carefully the postwar
development of the covenant litigation. See Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive
Covenants, 12 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 198 (1945); Anti-Discrimination Legislation and Inter-
national Declarations as Evidence of Public Policy Against Restrictive Covenants, 13 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 477 (1946). A comprehensive review and criticism of all aspects of the covenant liti-
gation is to be found in McGovney, Racial Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Re-
strictive Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 Calif. L.
Rev. 5 (z945); see also Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 Yale L. J. 426 (1948).
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a non-discrimination provision in the Redevelopment Companies Law and in-
clusion of such a provision in the Public Housing Law" indicated a legislative
intent not to prohibit discrimination by redevelopment companiesx3 This view
may appear to have merit, especially since the legislatures of several of the
states that have adopted laws similar to the Redevelopment Companies Law
have included in them express anti-discrimination provisions.4 But considera-
tions of legislative intent cannot foreclose the constitutional issue. Regardless
of state legislation the Fourteenth Amendment would seem to forbid dis-
crimination in projects entirely state-operated. In such a case the discrimination
would constitute undoubted state action. The best case is probably Biwhanan v.
Warley,"s in which the Supreme Court held that an ordinance zoning the city of
Louisville on a racial basis violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The specific
ground of the decision was that the ordinance, by restricting the seller's right
of alienation, deprived him of property without due process of law; but the
Court said also that the occupancy and necessarily the purchase and sale of
property cannot be prohibited by the state solely because of the color of the
proposed occupant. 6
The plaintiffs' contention that a project made possible by extensive public
aid is subject to constitutional limitations, even though nominallyprivate, merits
careful consideration. The contention took the form of an attempt to spell out
an agency in the defendants to implement state and city purposes in slum
clearance and in low-rent housing. The defendants refuted the agency argument
by pointing out that the City could not legally have undertaken such a project
as Stuyvesant Town. 7 However, the plaintiffs' position would not seem to
depend upon the establishment of an agency in the orthodox sense; certainly
"New York Public Housing Law (McKinney, i945) c. 8o8, § 223. See the discussion note
8 supra.
'3 The Court said: "... a rather narrow question is here presented; that is, whether our
statute books contain any specific provision against discrimination in housing on the ground
of race, color, creed or religion.... [I]t is to be noted that, not only were unsuccessful at-
tempts made to insert an anti-discrimination provision in the Constitution during the 1938
Constitutional Convention, but equally unsuccessful efforts were thereafter ifiade to amend
the Redevelopment Law and the Civil Rights Law as to so provide.... However,. . . such
efforts were successful so far as they concerned the Public Housing Law and the Adminis-
trative Code of the City of New York." Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 74 N.Y.S.
2d 220, 223 (1947).
S4Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1945) c. 48-8503(b); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1946) tit. 35,
§ 1711(8); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 671, § 82 which provides that no deed of conveyance of
the Land Clearance Commission or any subsequent owner shall contain a racial or religious
restrictive covenant.
'S245 U.S. 6o (1917). Accord: City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930); Harmon
v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1926).
16 For an excellent discussion of the case see McGovney, Racial Segregation by State
Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions in Deeds Is Un-
constitutional, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5 (1945).
'7 See discussion note 8 supra.
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none of the parties to the contract intended, for example, that the City should
be liable for the torts of Stuyvesant Town Corporation. The thrust of the
position seems to be rather that an interdependent, cooperative relationship
was entered into whereby the City and the defendants, each proceeding within
the limits conferred under constitutional and statutory authority, have jointly
made Stuyvesant Town possible. It is plain that without the Redevelopment
Companies Law there would have been no Stuyvesant housing project. The
City could have undertaken another type of housing project by itself under the
Public Housing Law. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, as it has else-
where done,"S could have constructed housing through its own resources without
the benefit of condemnation and tax exemption. But Stuyvesant Town, dis-
placing a slum area in the heart of Manhattan, incorporating city streets, and
providing moderate rental housing for 24,000 people, could have been achieved
only by the cooperation of the city government and private capital as enabled
by the Redevelopment Companies Law.19 The extent of the state's interest and
initiative is indicated by the fact that the City would have saved approxi-
mately $33,000,000 if it had simply bought the land and presented it to Metro-
politan as a gift instead of providing for a twenty-five-year tax exemption on
the improvements.20
Because interdependent public and private activity comprised the indis-
IS Metropolitan Life Makes Housing Pay, 33 Fortune 133 (April, 1946).
19 New York Redevelopment Companies Law (McKinney, 1943) C. 234, § 3402 declares,
passim, that the public interest requires the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and neigh-
borhood rehabilitation of substandard and unsanitary areas; that this cannot be done by the
ordinary operation of private capital; that provision must be made to encourage the invest-
ment of funds engaged in providing redevelopment facilities to be constructed according to
the requirements of city planning and in effectuation of official city plans, and regulated by
law as to profits, dividends, and disposition of their property or franchise; that provision be
made for the acquisition for corporations at fair prices of real property in substandard areas,
and for public assistance of such corporations by the granting of partial tax exemptions;
that the cooperation of the state and its subdivisions is necessary to accomplish such pur-
poses; "that the clearance, replanning and reconstruction, rehabilitation, and modernization
of substandard, and insanitary areas, and the provision of adequate, safe, sanitary and prop-
erly planned housing accommodations in effectuation of official city plans by such corporations
in these areas are public uses and purposes for which private property may be acquired for
such corporations and partial tax exemptions granted; that these conditions require the crea-
tion of the agencies, instrumentalities and corporations hereinafter prescribed for the purpose
of attaining the ends herein recited; and the necessity in the public interest for the provisions
hereinafter enacted is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination."
2, The cost of the project is estimated at about $9o,ooo,ooo. The cost of the land was about
$1 7,000,000. The total tax exemption over the twenty-five-year period, computed on the basis of
3% on the improvement cost-about $73,ooo,ooo-amounts to over $5o,ooo,ooo,whichis three
times the cost of the land. "In arriving at the figure of 5o million dollars, Charles Abrams,
attorney for the plaintiffs, apparently based his calculations on the current tax rate and the
assessed valuation which probably would have been used in the absence of the subsidy, a
combination amounting to approximately 2 million dollars annually for over 25 years. The
present value of the total subsidy might more accurately be calculated by discounting the
amount of the exemption for future years." Blum and Bursler, Tax Subsidies for Rental Hous-
ing, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 269 (1948). In either event it is clear that the cost of the tax
exemption is much greater than the cost of the land.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
pensable basis of the project's existence and will control its future, it is reason-
able to regard the power lodged in Stuyvesant Town Corporation as a manifes-
tation of governmental power and subject to its limitations. In a group of recent
decisions the courts have indicated a willingness to restrain even "private"
organizations from discriminating when their status and functioning were so
dependent upon legislation as to render them virtually "quasi-public." In Kerr
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,21 the closest in point of these cases, a library had
been founded with a private grant of more than a million dollars conditioned
upon an annual contribution by the city of $5o,ooo towards its maintenance,
and the state had passed a statute authorizing the city to accept the grant. It
was held that the self-perpetuating board of trustees appointed by the settlor
could not bar a Negro from the library's school for librarians merely because of
her race. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the state
aid was so extensive that it would be unrealistic to regard the library as an
entirely private organization. The court concluded, therefore, that the dis-
crimination by the trustees was tantamount to state action. The court said:
"How can the well known policy of the Library.. . be justified as solely the
act of a private organization when the state, through the municipality, con-
tinues to supply it with the means of existence?" 2 In Betts v. Easley23 the Kansas
Supreme Court construed the Railway Labor Act,24 under which a union had a
closed-shop contract, as permitting the union to exclude Negroes from par-
ticipation in collective bargaining and on this basis held the statute uncon-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment as a discriminatory exercise of federal
power. This decision followed Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,'5 in which
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act by
construing it to require that the union use its bargaining power derived from the
statute in a non-discriminatory way. The Court indicated, however, that had
the statute conferred power on the union to discriminate, its negoiiation of the
contract would have been discriminatory federal action.26 In addition, there are
the well-known "white primary" cases. Although these cases are distinguish-
able in that they involve, in a special context of studied avoidance, the federally
guaranteed right to vote in federal elections,', they are further indications of a
trend. In the latest of these cases to reach the Supreme Court, Smith v. All-
wright,2 it Was held that the action of the Democratic Party of Texas in exclud-
149 F. 2d 212 (C.C.A. 4th, 1945). -Ibid., at 219.
23 161 Kan. 558, 169 P. 2d 831 (1946), noted 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 292 (1946). For further
discussion see Judicial Intervention in Internal Affairs of Labor Unions, 14 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 479 (I946).
2448 Stat. ii85 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 15I (,943).
323 U.S. 192 (1944). 26 Ibid., at 198, xi9.
27 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 209 (1941).
28 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Beginning with Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) in which it
was held that the state could not by statute exclude Negroes from the Democratic primary
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ing Negroes from the primary election was state action subject to constitutional
limitations. The Court said: "The party takes its character as a state agency
from the duties imposed upon it by statute; the duties do not become matters
of private law because they are performed by a political party. '29
The constitutionality of the discrimination practiced by Stuyvesant Town
may be questioned on another basis. In Marsh v. Alabama3o the Supreme Court
held that the managers of a company-owned industrial town could not con-
sistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments deny to a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, on the ground that she was trespassing, the right to use the streets for the
distribution of religious literature. In reversing her conviction under a statute3'
which made trespass after warning a crime, the Supreme Court said: "The
managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and
religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the constitutional
guarantees."132 "Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit
the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it [the com-
pany town] is subject to state regulation."33 In the Marsh case the company
town appeared to have the same facilities and functions as any ordinary mu-
nicipality and therefore was required, like an ordinary municipality, to main-
tain freedom of speech, press, and religion. Stuyvesant Town presents a similar
case; it has residential buildings, shopping facilities, streets, postal service, and
playgrounds and appears to be simply a part of New York City, just as the
company town in the Marsh case appeared to be part of the surrounding city of
Mobile.
The Marsh case might be distinguished, however; therein the Court was
enforcing explicit and jealously guarded civil rights-freedom of speech, press,
and religion34-whereas in the instant cases the right asserted is more general:
the right not to be denied equal protection of the laws. The New York trial
court stated that the civil rights article of the state constitution3s created no
election, and ending in the Smith case, which overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 294 U.S. 669
(1935), each successive attempt by the State of Texas to detach itself from the Democratic
primary so as to avoid constitutional limitations has failed. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932), held the attempt of the state executive committee to exclude Negroes from the primary
of the Democratic Party to be state action; cf. Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (S.C., I947),
aff'd Rice v. Elmore, i65 F. 2d 387 (C.C.A. 4th, 1948), noted 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 756 (1948),
wherein it was held that the Democratic Party of South Carolina could not constitutionally
exclude Negroes from the primary election even though all laws relating to primary elections
had been repealed.
29 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944). 30 326 U.S. 501 (946).
3 Ala. Code Ann. (Mitichie, 1940) tit. 14, §426.
32 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5oI, S08 (1946). 33 Ibid., at 506.
34 Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. zo (943), and cases cited therein.
3s N.Y. Const. Art. z, § ii provides: "No person shall, because of race, color, creed, or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state."
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new civil rights and that there is no civil right not to be discriminated against
in housing.36 Nonetheless, if Stuyvesant Town's exclusion of the plaintiffs be-
cause of race amounts to state action it transgresses the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Probably under the doctrine of the Marsh case
Stuyvesant Town may not inhibit the freedom of speech or religion of persons
entering its streets. Whether or not the Marsh doctrine is broad enough to
bridge the gap between the rights to freedom of speech and religion and the
asserted right not to be subjected to racial discrimination by a corporation
allegedly exercising powers analogous to state power can only be speculated
upon. If it were possible to determine from the Marsh case whether there the
company town could have denied residential facilities to Negroes, the question
would not be so difficult in the instant cases. But the following language in
the Marsh case, which contrasts markedly with the language of the Court in
the instant cases, 37 suggests an answer:
We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the question. The
State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw
is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We
cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in gen-
eral, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it.38
The fact that Metropolitan is constructing a project in New York known as
Riverton for exclusive occupation by Negroes impelled the plaintiffs to fore-
close the "equal but separate facilities" argument, not actually made by de-
fendants, by pointing out 39 that the Riverton project is subject to the city
ordinance forbidding discrimination in tax-exempt projects.4o Riverton there-
fore cannot be maintained exclusively for Negroes and cannot be held out as a
"separate but equal facility." In the states which follow the doctrine it may
constitute a defense to an action similar to the instant cases. But the doctrine
has suffered considerable attrition since it was laid down by the Supreme Court
fifty years ago in Plessy v. Fergsomn;4' the Court has been increasingly insistent
upon the "equal" aspect of the formula2 and it is probable that proprietors of
36 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 74 N.Y.S. 2d 220, 222-23 (1947).
37 Note 9 supra.
38 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5o, 505-6 (I944).
39 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, Brief of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for
Temporary Injunction p. 40 (July, 1947).
4o Administrative Code of the City of New York § J. 41-1.2 (July, 1944).
4' 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
42Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 68 S. Ct. 299 (1948); Mis-
souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Even such a showing might not be enough.
In Westminster School District of Orange County v. Mendez, i6i F. 2d 744 (C.C.A. 9th,
1947) the court implied that there could be no such thing as "separate but equal" facilities
and held that separate school facilities for children of Mexican origin denied to them equal
protection of the laws.
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housing projects seeking to defend the legality of their discrimination on the
basis of the Plessy case would have to make a clear showing of the availability
of genuinely equal facilities.
The economic justification for Metropolitan's position-the notion that
Negro occupancy would cause a white exodus with a consequent diminution in
the value of the property-was disclosed by the defendants' allegation that if
they were enjoined from discriminating they would be deprived of valuable
property rights without due process of law. Although in the past this position
may have been tenable, the present housing shortage renders it virtually nuga-
tory. Moreover, interracial occupancy of housing projects, including wartime
projects built for higher income tenancy, has in general been economically and
socially successful.43 Therefore, were the cases to turn on the due process ques-
tion, it is difficult to perceive in what respect the defendants could claim that
they would be damaged. Furthermore, if a property value has been maintained
only because of an unconstitutional discrimination, its owner can scarcely ex-
pect to be compensated for a decline in the value resulting from elimination of
the discrimination.
Since the Polier and Dorsey actions each seek the same ultimate result, the
question arises whether the substantive question is any different if presented
one way or the other and whether the ultimate result is more likely to be
achieved through one course or the other. Since the plaintiffs consolidated both
cases for appeal, it is apparent that they regarded the substantive issues as the
same. However, a taxpayer's suit to enjoin allowance of the tax exemption by
the City as long as the defendants continue to discriminate attacks immediately
and directly the state aid, assumes at once the presence of state action without
regard to whether the project is public, quasi-public, or private, and leaves only
the question of whether the admitted state action is sufficiently connected with
the discrimination. It is true that the Dorsey case raises the same question, but
it does not do it with the same directness or with the same rhetorical force.
For example, if Metropolitan were the subsidized owner of many scattered, indi-
vidual dwelling units instead of an entire housing project, the analogy of the
Marsh case, upon which the Dorsey action leans so heavily, would not be ap-
plicable. The only question would be whether the state aid was of such quantity
and quality that the discrimination constitutes state action. When the issue is
placed in such sharp relief it might be difficult for a court to decide the case
merely by determining that the project involved was not public, which is
essentially all that the Court decided in the Dorsey case in order to reach its
decision.
A possible result of a final decision favorable to the plaintiffs in the Polier
case might be continued discrimination by the companies despite the injunction
upon the state aid. Although the companies would then suffer a loss, they could
43Annual Conference of Racial Relations Advisers, Experience in Public Housing Projects
Jointly Occupied by Negro, White, and Other Tenants 4 (1944)-
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continue to discriminate. A more likely result, however, would be admission of
Negroes to the project in order that the subsidy be continued.
Although the companies in the instant case admitted they were discriminat-
ing, it is probable that in similar cases there would be denials. Difficult prob-
lems of proof would then be presented. Experience of the temporary federal
Fair Employment Practice Commission and of various state Fair Employment-
Practice Commissions indicates, however, that most problems of proof of dis-
crimination and of the administration of remedies have not been insurmount-
able.44 In the case of a large housing project mere reference to the percentage of
Negro tenants to Negro applicants otherwise eligible as compared to the per-
centage of white tenants to white eligible applicants should indicate whether
discrimination is being practiced. There seems, then, to be no reason why an
injunction would not be appropriate and adequate if the plaintiffs in the
Dorsey case were entitled to relief.45 Difficulty would arise if a few Negroes were
being accepted as tenants; under such circumstances Negroes suing to enjoin
discrimination might prove statistically that the project was discriminating,
but they might not be able to prove that the project had discriminated against
them personally. In an action such as the Polier case, however, which seeks to
enjoin the state aid, there is no necessity to prove that any particular individual
has been discriminated against; so if a cause of action could be maintained, the
only proof required would seem to be statistical evidence that the project was
discriminating in general.
An ultimate decision for the plaintiffs in the instant cases might well mark an
extension of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond that which
has generally been considered their scope.46 A number of state-subsidized ac-
tivities, previously regarded as "private," might become subject to attack for
discrimination, either directly by injunction or by loss of subsidy. For example,
the Federal Housing Authority might not be permitted to insist, as it has fre-
quently done in the past, upon protection by racial restrictive covenants of the
44 See Report of the President's Committee on Civil Liberties, § 4 (W)47); Hunt, The Pro-
posed Fair Employment Practice Act: Facts and Fallacies, 32 Va. L. Rev. i (1946); Murray,
The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 388 (1945).
45 Query whether the result would be res judicata as to all persons similarly situated. The
class to be bound is very large, but not undefinable. It would seem to comprise all persons who
might, apart from their race, be eligible for occupancy and who might seek occupancy.
A minority policy holders' derivative suit might be an additional type of action that could
have been brought, but the obstacles to maintaining such a suit under the circumstances
would seem prohibitive. But see Shareholder Derivative Suit as a Check on Corporate Anti-
Labor Policies, x5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (i948).
46As far back as the Civil Rights Cases, o0 U.S. 3 (883), which first held that it is only
state action that is limited by the i 4th Amendment, Justice Harlan, dissenting at 26, 37-43,maintained that the discrimination practiced by the defendant hotels, railroads, and theaters
constituted state action because their existence was made possible through various forms of
governmental privilege and subsidy. A decision in favor of the plaintiffs in the Stuyvesant
Town litigation would thus appear to cut deeply into the doctrine of the majority decision in
the Civil Rights Cases.
RECENT CASES
value of property on which it guarantees loans.47 Even in the absence of legisla-
tion private employers receiving government priorities or engaged on public
works might not be allowed to discriminate. Corporations benefiting from postal
or tax subsidies, from eminent domain, or from other special privileges such as
tariff subsidies might be held to exercise state power for these purposes. A dif-
ficult problem would thereby be posed: the courts would have to determine at
what point subsidies, obvious or hidden, become so extensive that a recipient's
discrimination is state action subject to constitutional limitations. Probably a
decision in the Stuyvesant litigation enjoining the discrimination or the tax
subsidy could be limited in its application as a precedent to cases in which the
recipient of the state aid has been organized especially to take advantage of it
in the accomplishment of a public purpose, in which it appears that the recipient
cannot accomplish the purpose without the aid, and in which extensive and pro-
longed public controls are exercised. Nevertheless, the examples cited indicate
on how wide a legal front the fight to enlarge the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment is likely to be fought.48
Even if the cases are restricted in their application as precedents, the final
outcome of the Stuyvesant Town litigation will unquestionably influence the
future pattern of housing in the United States. An estimated 39 per cent of the
dwellings in the nation are substandard, and urban redevelopment has become
a principal device for rebuilding depressed areas.49 Twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia now have some type of urban redevelopment legislation,
and bills are now pending before the legislatures in thirteen additional states;s
but anti-discrimination provisions have been included in only a few of the re-
development laws similar to the New York law.s' An important element of this
process is the role played by insurance companies in determining the living con-
ditions of much of the population. Although not all of its projects are being con-
structed under redevelopment laws, it is noteworthy that when its current
projects are completed Metropolitan will be landlord to ioo,ooo people.s' The
47 Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592 (part 2), 79 th
Cong. ist Sess., at 759 (I945).
48 Some implications of enlarging the concept of state action are set forth in Hale, Rights
Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private
Individuals, 5 Lawyers Guild Rev. 627 (x946), and in Miller, IndividualInvasion of Individual
Rights, 3 Nat. Bar. J. 126 (1945).
49 Statement of John B. Blanchford, Jr., former National Housing Administrator, before
the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment of the Senate Special Committee on
Post War Economic Policy and Planning, 79 th Cong. ist Sess., at 1233-37 (1945).
so National Housing Agency, Comparative Digest of the Principal Provisions of Urban
Redevelopment Legislation 1 (1947). For a discussion of tax-exemption provisions see Blum
and Bursler, Tax Subsidies for Rental Housing, iS Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1948).
s Statutes cited note 14 supra.
s2Testimony of George Gove, vice-president of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 8oth Cong. ist Sess., at 340-41 (i947).
Metropolitan has constructed housing projects in New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
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nation as a whole might well benefit were insurance companies with their vast
influence in the commercial and industrial life of the country to have a financial
stake in the success of interracial housing projects.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN SOUTHERN PRIMARIES
Four years ago South Carolina made the latest move in the game of constitu-
tional chess which the southern states have long been playing with the Supreme
Court on the question of the "white primary." The South Carolina legislature
repealed every statute relating in any way to primary elections or political
parties,' and proposed a constitutional amendment, 2subsequently ratified3 by
the voters at the general election of i944, which eliminated every reference to
"primary" and "political party" in the state constitution. The Democratic
state convention then met and adopted a set of regulations embodying virtually
all the provisions previously contained in the repealed statutes. By this action
it was hoped to circumvent the rulings in Smith v. Allwright4 and United States v.
Classic,s and thus enable the Democratic Party, in the guise of a private club, to
retain an all-white primary. In an action for a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the rights of Negro voters under the new primary rules, the federal district
court held that in the South Carolina Democratic convention the "people of the
State... had enacted" what amounted to "custom, usage, or regulation" of
the state, and that such state action depriving the Negro plaintiff and others
similarly situated of the right to vote violated the Fifteenth Amendment of the
federal Constitution.6 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the decision, but on
the ground that the South Carolina primary is an integral, inseparable part of
the election machinery of the state, and when party officials deny the Negro a
vote in what is a part of the state's election machinery, they are exercising state
power for an unconstitutional purpose. Rice v. Elmore.7
and Alexandria, Virginia and has over $200,000,000 invested in housing. Metropolitan Life
Makes Housing Pay, 33 Fortune 133 (April, 1946). Its Parkchester Project in New York is
the best-paying investment that it has. Ibid., at 134. Since the New York Redevelopment
Companies Law, § 3408, permits the corporate owner of a housing project to earn 6% on its
investment it is particularly interesting to note that Metropolitan reported to the New York
Insurance Commission in 1946 that its income from all assets averaged exactly 3%. PM, § i, p.
iI, col. 3 (July 30, 1947). Metropolitan has constantly earned its statutory 6% on its New
York and other housing projects. Metropolitan Life Makes Housing Pay, 33 Fortune 133,
209 (April, 1946).
1 S.C. Acts Extra. Sess. 1944, Nos. 688-839. In 1943 the Legislature had repealed forty-five
code provisions governing the conduct of the primary effective June 1, 1944. S.C. Acts 1943,
No. 63.
2S.C. Acts Extra. Sess. i944, No. 83o.
3S.C. Acts 1945
, 
No. xi, whereby the amendment to Article 1I, § io of the Constitution
was adopted by the voters at the general election of 1944.
4 321 U.S. 649 (1944). S3I 3 U.S. 299 (1941).6Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (S.C., 1947), aff'd on other grounds, Rice v. Elmore,
165 F. 2d 3 87(C.C.A. 4th, i947), noted in 33 Iowa L. Rev. 412 (1948).
7 Rice v. Elmore, i65 F. 2d 3 87(C.C.A. 4th, 1947), cert. den. 16 U.S.L. Week 3314 (1948).
